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Abstract
The problem of transmitting an i.i.d Gaussian source over an i.i.d Gaussian wiretap channel with an i.i.d
Gaussian side information is considered. The intended receiver is assumed to have a certain minimum SNR and the
eavesdropper is assumed to have a strictly lower SNR compared to the intended receiver. The objective is minimizing
the distortion of source reconstruction at the intended receiver. It is shown, in this work, that unlike the Gaussian
wiretap channel without side information, Shannon’s source-channel separation coding scheme is not optimum in the
sense of achieving the minimum distortion. Three hybrid digital-analog secure joint source channel coding schemes
are then proposed which achieve the minimum distortion. The first coding scheme is based on Costa’s dirty paper
coding scheme and wiretap channel coding scheme when the analog source is not explicitly quantized. The second
coding scheme is based on superposition of the secure digital signal and the hybrid digital-analog signal. It is shown
that for the problem of communicating a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side information,
there exists an infinite family of optimum secure joint source-channel coding scheme. In the third coding scheme,
the quantized signal and the analog error signal are explicitly superimposed. It is shown that this scheme provide an
infinite family of optimum secure joint source-channel channel coding schemes with a variable number of binning.
Finally, the proposed secure hybrid digital-analog schemes are analyzed under the main channel SNR mismatch. It
is proven that the proposed schemes can give a graceful degradation of distortion with SNR under SNR mismatch,
i.e., when the actual SNR is larger than the designed SNR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security protocols are the most critical elements involved in enabling the growth of the wide range of wireless
data networks and applications. The broadcast nature of wireless communications, however, makes them particularly
vulnerable to eavesdropping. With the proliferation of more complex modern infrastructure systems, there is an in-
creasing need for secure communication solutions. Cryptography is a traditional field that provides computationally-
secure protocols at the application layer. The goal of cryptography has recently been diversified from providing
the critical confidentiality service, to other issues including authentication, key exchange and management, digital
signature, and more. Unlike the cryptographic approaches, the recently reintroduced physical-layer security aims
to develop effective secure communication schemes exploiting the properties of the physical layer. This new
paradigm can strength the security of existing systems by introducing a level of information-theoretic security
which has provable security, as compared with computational security. The notion of information theoretic secrecy
in communication systems was first introduced in [1]. The information theoretic secrecy requires that the received
signal by an eavesdropper not provide any information about the transmitted messages. Following the pioneering
works of [2] and [3] which studied the wiretap channel, many extensions of wiretap channel model have been
considered from a perfect secrecy point of view (see e.g., [4]–[8]).
In [9], [10], the Gaussian wiretap channel of [11] is extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel with side
information available at the transmitter. In the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, an i.i.d additive white
Gaussian interference is added to the transmitted signal. The interference is completely known at the transmitter
an can be used as a covert communication channel. References [9], [10] have proposed an achievable perfect
secrecy rate for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. The achievable coding scheme of [9], [10] is
a combination of the Costa’s dirty-paper-coding [12] and the wiretap channel coding, and the source is assumed
to be digital. We refer to this coding scheme as Digital-Secret Dirty-Paper-Coding (DS-DPC) scheme.
All extensions of wiretap channel model have considered communicating a discrete source with perfect secrecy
constraint. In many applications, however, a bandlimited analog source need to be transmitted on a bandlimited
Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. In many situations, the exact signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
main channel may not be known at the transmitter. Usually, a range of the main channel SNR is known but the
true SNR value is unknown. Given a range of main channel SNR such that the eavesdropper’s signal is degraded
with respect to the legitimate receiver’s signal, it is desirable to design a single transmitter which has a robust
performance for all range of SNRs. A common method of designing such a system is based on Shannon’s source-
channel separation coding: Quantize the analog source and then transmit the result discrete source by the digital
secret dirty paper coding scheme. The main advantage of a digital system is that it is more reliable an cost efficient.
The inherent problem of digital systems is that they suffer from a severe form of ”threshold effect” [13], [14].
This effect can briefly described as follows: The system achieves a certain performance at a certain designed SNR.
When the SNR is increased, the system performance, however, does not improved and it degrades drastically when
the true SNR falls below the designed SNR. The severity of the threshold effect in digital systems is related to
Shannon’s source-channel separation principle [15]. Recent works on non-secure communication systems, however,
proved that joint source-channel coding schemes not only can outperform the digital systems for a fixed complexity
and delay, they are also more robust against the SNR variations [16]–[20].
In [18], several hybrid digital-analog joint source channel coding scheme is proposed for transmitting a Gaussian
source over a (non-secure) Gaussian channel (without side information). The main idea in [18] to increase robustness
is to reduce the number of quantization intervals, and thereby increase the distance between the decision lines of the
quantization levels. This will, however, increase the distortion. Therefore, to compensate the coarser representation,
the quantization error is sent as an analog symbol using a linear coder (see also [21]). In [22], different coding
schemes is analyzed for transmitting a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel (without side information).
For a fixed information leakage rate to the eavesdropper, [22] has showed that superimposing the secure digital
signal with the analog (quantization error) part has better performance compared to the separation based scheme
and the uncoded scheme. In [23], the problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over a (non-secure) Gaussian
channel with side information is studied. [23] has introduced several hybrid digital-analog forms of the Costa and
Wyner-Ziv coding ( [24]) schemes. In [23], the results of [25] is extended to the case that the transmitter or receiver
has side information, and showed that there are infinitely many schemes for achieving the optimal distortion.
In this paper, motivated by a covert communication system, we consider the problem of transmitting an i.i.d
Gaussian source over an i.i.d Gaussian wiretap channel with side information available at the transmitter. We
assume that the intended receiver has a certain minimum SNR and the eavesdropper has a strictly lower SNR
compared to the intended receiver. We are interested in minimizing the distortion of source reconstruction at the
intended receiver. We show that, here, unlike the Gaussian wiretap channel without side information, Shannon’s
source-channel separation coding scheme is not optimum in the sense of achieving the minimum distortion. We
then propose three hybrid digital-analog secure joint source channel coding schemes which achieve the minimum
distortion. Our first coding schemes are based on Costa’s dirty paper coding scheme and wiretap channel coding
scheme when the analog source is not explicitly quantized. We will illustrate that this scheme provide us an extra
degree of freedom and therefore we can achieve the optimum distortion. Our second coding scheme is based on
superposition of secure digital and hybrid digital-analog signals. We will show that for the problem of communicating
a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, there exists an infinite family of optimum
secure joint source-channel coding scheme. We explicitly superimpose the quantized and analog signals in our third
coding scheme. We will show that this scheme provide an infinite family of optimum secure joint source-channel
channel coding schemes with a variable number of binning. Finally, we analyze our secure hybrid digital-analog
schemes under the main channel SNR mismatch. We will show that our proposed schemes can give a graceful
degradation of distortion with SNR under SNR mismatch, i.e., when the actual SNR is larger than the designed
SNR.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORKS
A. Notation
In this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X) and their realizations are denoted by
corresponding lower case letters (e.g. x). The finite alphabet of a random variable is denoted by a script letter (e.g.
X ) and its probability distribution is denoted by P (x). The vectors will be written as xn = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where
subscripted letters denote the components and superscripted letters denote the vector. The notation xji denotes the
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Fig. 1. Block digram of the secure joint source channel coding problem with Interference known only at the transmitter
vector (xi, xi+1, ..., xj) for j ≥ i. A Gaussian Random variable X with mean of m and variance of σ2 is denoted
by X ∼ N (m,σ2). The function E[.] represents statistical expectation.
B. System Model And Problem Statement
Source Model: Consider a memoryless Gaussian source of {Vi}∞i=1 with zero mean and variance σ2v . Thus,
Vi ∼ N (0, σ
2
v) and assume that the sequence {Vi} is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). We assume that
the source is obtained from uniform sampling of a continuous-time Gaussian process with bandwidth Ws(Hz).
Furthermore, we assume that the sampling rate is 2Ws samples per second.
Channel Model: The source is transmitted over an Additive White Gaussian (AWGN) wiretap channel in the
presence of an interference Si which is known to the transmitter but unknown to the receivers. The channel is
modeled as follows:
Yi = Xi + Si +Wi, (1)
Zi = Xi + Si +W
′
i ,
where Xi, Yi and Zi are the channel input, the received signal by the intended receiver and the received signal by the
eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that E[X2i ] ≤ P , and Wi ∼ N (0, N1), W
′
i ∼ N (0, N2). Furthermore, assume
that Si’s are a sequence of real i.i.d Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance Q, i.e. Si ∼ N (0, Q).
As the source, interference and the channel are i.i.d over the time, we will omit the index i through the rest of
the paper. The channel is derived from a continuous-time AWGN wiretap channel with bandwidth Wc(Hz). The
equivalent discrete-time channel is used at a rate of 2Wc channel uses per second. The block diagram of the system
is depicted in Fig.1.
Coding Scheme: The source samples are grouped into blocks os size m
V m = (V1, V2, ..., Vm),
and the encoder is a mapping fm : Rm → Rn which satisfies the power constraint E[‖fm(V m)‖n] ≤ nP . Let us
define the parameter ρ = n/m =Wc/Ws. In this paper we assume that ρ = 1. The received signals by the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
Y n = Xn + Sn +W n, (2)
Zn = Xn + Sn +W
′n,
where Xn = fm(V m), W n ∼ N (0, N1In), W
′n ∼ N (0, N2In), and In is the n× n identity matrix. The decoder
at the intended receiver is a mapping gm : Rn → Rm. The secrecy of the system is measured by the information
leaked to the eavesdropper and is expressed as Iǫ = 1nI(V
m;Zn). Note that Iǫ = 0 corresponds to perfect secrecy
condition and implies that the eavesdropper obtains no information about the source. In this paper we consider
the perfect secrecy situation. The average squared-error distortion of the coding scheme at the intended receiver is
given by
Dave,m(fm, gm, N1, N2) =
1
m
E[‖V m − Vˆ m‖2], (3)
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where Vˆ m = gn(Y n). For the purpose of analysis, we will consider sequences of codes (fn, gn), where m is
increasing but the ration ρ = n/m is fixed. The asymptotic performance of the code is given by
Dave(N1, N2) = lim
m→∞
Dave,m(fm, gm, N1, N2). (4)
Note that the above Dave is also a function of σ2v > 0, P > 0, Q > 0, and ρ > 0, but we assume that these
parameters are known and fixed, and therefore express Dave as a function of (N1, N2). In subsequent sections, we
refer to Dave as mean-squared distortion and omit the superscript ”ave” and denote it by D, i.e., D = Dave.
Distortion Exponent: In practical scenarios, the transmitter usually does not have an exact knowledge of N1 but
knows that N1 ≤ Nd, where Nd is the noise variance corresponding to the design SNRd = PNd . The eavesdropper
channel is still a degraded version of the main channel and is assumed to have the lowest SNR2 < SNRd < SNR1,
where SNR2 = PN2 and SNR1 =
P
N1
. The receiver is assumed to have a perfect estimate of SNR1, but the
transmitter communicates at a lower designed SNRd. In this scenario, we expect a graceful degradation of distortion
D(SNR1) with SNR1 compared with D(SNRd) when the actual SNR1 > SNRd. Let define the distortion
exponent as follows:
Definition 1: For a fixed SNR2, the distortion exponent of D(SNR1) is given by
ζ
△
= − lim
SNR1→∞
logD(SNR1)
log SNR1
. (5)
The highest possible distortion exponent is ρ and therefore, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ ρ. The distortion exponent can be used as
a criterion for the robustness of a coding scheme. A high distortion exponent means that the coding scheme is
more robust. In this paper, we propose different robust coding schemes which achieve the optimum mean-squared
distortion. Before introducing our proposed schemes, we need to review some related works in this area.
C. Related Works
1) Digital Wiretap Channel: In a digital wiretap channel (without any interference S), a digital message
M ∈ {1, 2, ..., nCs} is transmitted to the intended receiver while the eavesdropper is kept ignorant. Wyner in
[2] characterized the secrecy capacity of this channel when the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded with respect to
the main channel. Csiszar et. al. in [3] considered the general wiretap channel and established its secrecy capacity.
Let us assume X, Y and Z be the channel input, intended receiver’s signal and eavesdropper’s signal, respectively.
The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is given by
Cs = 2Wc [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)] , (6)
where U → X → Y Z forms a Markov chain. When the channels are AWGN, [11] showed that the secrecy capacity
is given by
Cs =Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 +
P
N2
)
]
. (7)
Here, we briefly explain the coding scheme. We Generate 2nI(U ;Y ) Gaussian codewords Un and through them
uniformly at random into 2nCs bins. Each bin thus contains 2nI(U ;Z) codeword Un. To encode the message M ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2Cs} We randomly choose a Un from the bin which is indicated by M and send it. The intended receiver
seeks for a Un which is jointly typical with Y n and declare the bin index as the transmitted message. The
probability of error asymptotically tends to zero, i.e., limn→∞ Pe(Mˆ 6= M) → 0. The information leakage is
limn→∞
1
n
I(M ;Zn) = 0
2) Digital Dirty-Paper Coding: Consider transmitting a quantized (digital) source over a point-to-point AWGN
channel (without any eavesdropper) with side information known at the transmitter. The received signal in this
model can therefore be written as Y = X+S+W . Costa in [12] showed that the capacity of this channel is given
by
C =Wc log(1 +
P
N1
), (8)
which is equal to the capacity of an AWGN channel without the interferer S. The achievability scheme- which is
called Dirty-Paper Coding (DPC)- is as follows: Let
R = 2Wc [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)] , (9)
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where U → X → Y forms a Markov chain. We generate 2nI(U ;Y ) Gaussian codewords Un and through them into
2nR bins. In each bin there exists 2nI(U ;S) codewords. To transmit a message M ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR}, we choose a
Un in the bin which is indicated by the message M , such that (Un, Sn) are jointly typical. The channel input X
is generated as a function of U and S as follows:
U = X + αS, (10)
where X ∼ N (0, P ) is independent of S and α = P
P+N1
. The decoder seeks for a Un which is jointly typical
with Y n and declare the bin number as the transmitted message. The channel output is Y = X + S + W =
U + (1− α)S +W and it is easy to show that with α = P
P+N1
, the achievable rate R = C .
3) Digital Secret Dirty-Paper Coding: Consider transmitting a digital source over a Gaussian wiretap channel
in the presence of the interference S known only at the transmitter. The received signals by the intended user and
eavesdropper are given by
Y = X + S +W, (11)
Z = X + S +W
′
,
Even in a Gaussian case, the secrecy capacity of this problem is still unknown. We can get an achievable rate by
combining the secrecy coding of wiretap channel with Costa’s Dirty-Paper-Coding. We refer to this coding scheme
as Digital Secret-Dirty-Paper-Coding (DS-DPC). The following theorem characterizes the best known achievable
secure rate for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information using DS-DPC scheme:
Theorem 1: ( [9], [10]) For the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, an achievable secrecy rate is
given by
Rs = 2Wcmax
α
min{I(Uα;Y )− I(Uα;S), I(Uα;Y )− I(Uα;Z)}, (12)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a real number, Uα = X + αS, and X ∼ N (0, P ).
The above optimization is further analyzed in [9], [10] to provide the more explicit expression for the secrecy rate.
Let
R(α) = I(Uα;Y )− I(Uα;S), (13)
and
RZ(α) = I(Uα;Y )− I(Uα;Z). (14)
The function R(α) is maximized at α∗ = P
P+N1
and
R(α∗) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N1
)
. (15)
The function RZ(α) is maximized at α = 1 and
RZ(1) =
1
2
log
(
P +Q+N1
P +Q+N2
N2
N1
)
. (16)
It is easy to show that R(α0) = RZ(α0), where
α0 =
PQ+ P
√
Q (P +Q+N2)
Q(P +N2)
. (17)
Let
PL = −N1 −
Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4Q(N2 −N1)
2
(18)
PH = −
Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4QN2
2
,
then the secrecy rate of (12) can be written as
Rs =


R(α∗), if P ≤ PL;
R(α0), if PL ≤ P ≤ PH ;
RZ(1), if P ≥ PH .
(19)
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The above three cases correspond to the three possible cases of the optimization problem of maxαmin{R(α), RZ(α)}:
(1) R(α) is optimized at α = α∗, and R(α∗) < RZ(α∗); (2) RZ(α) is optimized at α = 1, and R(1) > RZ(1);
and (3) R(α) is optimized subject to R(α) = RZ(α).
It can be seen from the above equation that the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information has larger secrecy
capacity than the Gaussian wiretap channel without the interferer. The side information therefore helps to improve
the secrecy capacity. This is in contrast to the point-to-point channel without the secrecy constraint, in which the
side information does not affect the capacity.
As showed in [9], [10], the achievable secrecy rate given in (19) is indeed the secrecy capacity for the cases
when P ≤ PL and when P ≥ PH . The secrecy rate in the former case is the capacity of the channel without
secrecy constraint and with the transmitter knowing the state sequence (Dirty-Paper Channel). The secrecy rate in
the latter case is the secrecy capacity of an enhanced wire-tap channel, in which the state variable is used as the
channel input instead of the channel interference. Both of these two secrecy capacities are clearly upper bounds
on the secrecy capacity for the original wiretap channel with side information. Hence, achieving these two bounds
imply achieving the secrecy capacity.
III. SEPARATION BASED SCHEME
Let us consider our problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over the Gaussian wiretap channel with side
information as depicted in Fig.1. In this model no leakage information rate is allowed for the eavesdropper. As
assumed in this paper ρ = n/m = 1. In this section, we characterize the achievable distortion when the source
V n is first quantized using an optimum quantizer to produce an index m ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRs , where Rs is given in
(19). Then, the index m is transmitted using secret dirty paper coding scheme. As the quantizer output is digital
information, we refer to this scheme as digital secret dirty paper coding. We briefly review this scheme here.
Let Uα = X + αS, we first generate 2nI(Uα;Y ) i.i.d Gaussian sequences Unα and randomly distribute them into
2nRs bins such that each bin contains 2nmax{I(Uα;S),I(Uα;Z)}. We index each by m ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRs}. Then place
the 2nmax{I(Uα;S),I(Uα;Z)} codewords in each bin randomly into 2nmax{I(Uα;S),I(Uα;Z)}−nI(Uα;Z) subbins. To send
message m with an interference Sn, the encoder looks in bin m for sequences Unα such that (Unα , Sn) is jointly
typical. The encoder then randomly choose one of the Unα and transmits the associated Xn = Unα − αSn. The
legitimate receiver seeks for a unique sequence Unα such that (Y n, Unα ) is jointly typical and declares the index of
the bin containing Unα as the transmitted message.
Since the transmission rate is R = Rs, the distortion in V n is given by the distortion rate function of D(R). For
a Gaussian source and mean-squared error distortion D(R) = σ2v2−2R and therefore, the overall distortion is given
by
D = σ2v ×


N1
P+N1
, if P ≤ PL;
(P+α2
0
Q)(P+Q+N1)−(P+α0Q)
2
P (P+Q+N1)
, if PL ≤ P ≤ PH ;
P+Q+N2
P+Q+N1
N1
N2
, if P ≥ PH .
(20)
Note that the above distortion value for P ≥ PH is still greater than the optimum value, i.e., Dopt = σ2v2−2Iǫ N1P+N1 .
Therefore, while for P ≥ PH , the channel coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity, however, the separation
abased scheme to transmit a Gaussian source is not optimum. The following theorem illustrates this observation.
Theorem 2: For transmitting a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side information knowing
at the transmitter, the separation based scheme is not optimum, unless for P ≤ PL.
In the following section we show that there exist a few secure joint source channel coding schemes, which are
optimum for all range of P . Beside achieving the optimum distortion, we will show that our propose secure joint
source channel coding are robust when there is an SNR1 mismatch. We will analyze the robustness of these scheme
later on.
IV. SECURE HYBRID DIGITAL-ANALOG DIRTY PAPER CODING
A. Scheme I
In this section we propose a secure joint source channel coding scheme where the analog source V n is not
explicitly quantized. The code construction, encoding and decoding procedures are as follows.
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Let us define an auxiliary Gaussian random variable Uα,k as follows:
Uα,k = X + αS + kV, (21)
where X ∼ N (0, P ), and X, S and V are pairwise independent.
Codebook generation: We generate 2n(I(Uα,k;Y )+Iǫ) i.i.d sequences Unα,k, where each component of each sequence
is Gaussian with zero mean and variance P + α2Q + kσ2v . Then, we distribute these codewords into 2nR bins,
where R > 0.
Encoding: Given the interference sequence Sn and the source sequence V n, the encoder find Unα,k’s such that
(Unα,k, S
n, V n) are jointly typical. The encoder then randomly chooses one of them and transmits Xn = Un −
αSn − kV n. If such Un’s cannot be found, the encoder declares failure. Let Pe1 be the probability of an encoder
failure.
From the extensions of typicality to infinite alphabet case [26], we have limn→∞ Pe1 → 0 provided that
I(Uα,k;Y )−R > max {I(Uα,k;Z), I(Uα,k;SV )} , (22)
for any R > 0. Therefore the following condition must be satisfied:
I(Uα,k;Y ) > max {I(Uα,k;Z), I(Uα,k;SV )} . (23)
Decoding: The legitimate receiver, looks for a unique Unα,k such that (Unα,k, Y n) is jointly typical and declare
Unα,k as the decoder output. It is easy to show that if the condition of (23) is satisfied the probability that the
decoder output is not equal to the encoded Unα,k goes to zero when n→∞. The legitimate receiver then estimate
the source V n by using the pair (Unα,k, Y n) as follows:
Vˆ n = λ1Y
n + λ2U
n
α,k, (24)
where λ1 and λ2 are such that minimizes the distortion D = E[‖V − Vˆ ‖2]. After some algebra we can see that
the optimum values for (λ1, λ2) are given by
λ1 =
−kσ2v(P + αQ)
k2σ2v(P +Q+N1) + (1− α)
2PQ+N1(P + α2Q)
, (25)
λ2 =
kσ2v(P +Q+N1)
k2σ2v(P +Q+N1) + (1− α)
2PQ+N1(P + α2Q)
. (26)
The MMSE estimation therefore leads to the following distortion:
D(α, k) =
σ2v
1 + k
2σ2v
µ
, (27)
where µ is given by
µ =
(1− α)2PQ+N1(P + α
2Q)
P +Q+N1
. (28)
We need to find the optimum values of (α, k) which minimizes the distortion D with the constraint of (23). we
choose (α, k) such that I(Uα,k;Y ) > I(Uα,k;SV ) > I(Uα,k;Z). This constraint guarantees that the eavesdropper
cannot decode Uα,k. Our optimization problem can therefor be written as
min
(α,k)
D(α, k) (29)
s.t: I(Uα,k;Y ) > I(Uα,k;SV ) > I(Uα,k;Z).
After some manipulation, it is easy to see that the valid region of (α, k) is as follows (see Fig.2. for a typical
valid region): {
k2σ2v(P +Q+N2) > −Q(P +N2)α
2 + 2PQα+ P 2,
k2σ2v(P +Q+N1) < −(1− α)
2PQ−N1(P + α
2Q) + P (P +Q+N1)
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Fig. 2. A typical valid region for choosing (α, k) in scheme I
In this region the optimum values of (α, k) and the related D(α, k) are given by
α =
P
P +N1
, (30)
k2 =
P 2
σ2v(P +N1)
(31)
D =
σ2v
P+N1
N1
. (32)
The achievable distortion D is indeed optimum and is equal to the distortion of a Gaussian AWGN with side
information and without the secrecy constraint. Note that in this scheme, unlike the separation based scheme, we
can choose the above optimum (α, k) for all range of P . The parameter K (which is due to the analog source),
here, provides an extra degree of freedom. Therefore, we can choose the optimum values of (α, k) such that the
constraint of I(Uα,k;Y ) > I(Uα,k;SV ) > I(Uα,k;Z) be satisfied for all P .
Note that the proposed secure hybrid digital-analog dirty paper coding is not entirely analog in the sense that
the auxiliary random variable Uα,k is from a discrete codebook. In contrast to secure digital dirty paper coding
however the source is not explicitly quantized and is embedded into the transmitted signal X in an analog method.
An other feature of the secure analog dirty paper coding is that there is no need to double binning the codewords.
In the digital scheme however double binning is necessary which one binning is for dirty paper coding and the
other binning is for secrecy.
B. Scheme II
In this scheme, we choose the transmitted signal Xn as a superposition of two signals Xn1 and Xnh , which are the
outputs of secure digital and hybrid digital-analog dirty paper encoders, respectively. Fig.3. illustrates this scheme.
We first quantize the source at a rate R < Rs, where Rs is given in (19). Let the quantizer error be En = V n−V ∗n,
where V ∗n is the reconstruction of V n. The quantization error has a variance of σ2e = σ2v2−2R. We encode the
quantized digital part using a secure digital dirty paper encoder which treats Sn as the interference. The output
signal of this section is denoted by Xn1 which has a power of P1. The second part of the encoder is same as
scheme I, which treats Sn and Xn1 as interference. The output of this part is denoted by Xnh , which has a power
of Ph = P − P1. The transmitted signal is the superposition of Xn1 and Xnh , i.e., Xn = Xn1 +Xnh .
We choose the auxiliary random variable of the digital encoder as U1 = X1 + α1S, where X1 independent of
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S. The power P1 and α1 of this encoder are chosen as follows:
P1 = (P +N1)(1− 2
−2R), (33)
α1 =
P1
P1 + Ph +N1
.
Note that P1 > 0 and the above choice for α1 corresponds to treating Xh as noise in addition the channel noise
W .
In the second encoder, we encode the quantization error En using the coding scheme I. We choose the parameters
of this scheme as follows:
Ph= (P +N1)2
−2R −N1, (34)
αh=
Ph
Ph +N1
,
k2=
P 2h
σ2v(Ph +N1)
.
Note that as R ≤ 12 log
P+N1
N1
, the power Ph is always positive. The auxiliary random is chosen as Uα,k =
Xh + αh(X1 + S) + kE, where X1 + S considered as the net interference. Thus, we choose Xh independent of
X1, S and E.
The decoder, first decode the quantization index according the decoding rule of the secure digital dirty paper
coding scheme. After that it reconstructs V ∗n. Then, it estimate the quantization error En according the decoding
rule of Scheme I. The overall distortion is the distortion in estimating En. According to the analysis of Scheme I,
the overall distortion is given by
D=
σ2e
1 + (P+N1)2
−2R−N1
N1
(35)
=
σ2v
P+N1
N1
.
As we can see, for any coding rate R of the first encoder such that R < Rs, this scheme is valid and leads to
the optimal distortion. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For the problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side
information knowing at the transmitter, there exists an infinite family of optimum secure joint source channel
coding scheme.
C. Scheme III
This scheme is a combination of the scheme I and scheme II. In this scheme the quantized signal and the analog
part are explicitly superimposed.
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First, we quantize the source V n by using an optimal quantizer at rate R < Rs. Let V ∗n and En be the digital
reconstruction of V n, and the quantization error vector, respectively. According to the Rate-Distortion theorem, the
quantization error En is a i.i.d Gaussian vector.
We next define an auxiliary random variable Uα,k as follows:
Uα,k = X + αS + kE, (36)
where, X ∼ N (0, P ), E ∼ N (0, σ2v2−2R), and X, S and E are independent of each other. The coding/decoding
procedure is as follows:
Codebook Generation: We generate 2nI(Uα,k;Y ), i.i.d Gaussian sequences where each component has zero mean
and variance of P +α2Q+k2σ2v2−2R. Then we distribute these codewords into 2nR bins and this is shared between
the encoder and the decoder. The rate R must be chosen such that each bin contains
Nb = 2
nmax{I(Uα,k;SE),I(Uα,k;Z)} (37)
codewords. We then randomly distribute the Nb codewords of each bin into Nsb subbins, where Nsb is given by
Nsb = 2
nmax{I(Uα,k;SE),I(Uα,k;Z)}−nI(Uα,k;Z). (38)
Encoding: Let m ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR} be the quantization index corresponding to the quantized vector V ∗n. To send
the message m with an interference Sn, the encoder looks for Unα,k sequences in the bin m such that (Unα,k, Sn, En)
are jointly typical with respect to the distribution of (36). If such Unα,k cannot be found, encoder declares a failure.
Let Pe1 be the probability of encoding failure. The encoder then randomly choose of the Unα,k and transmits
Xn = Unα,k − αS
n − kEn.
Decoding: The received signal by the legitimate receiver is Y n = Xn+Sn+W n. The legitimate receiver looks
for a unique Unα,k such that is jointly typical with Y n. If such a unique Un can be found, the decoder declares Un
as the decoder output, otherwise, it declares a failure. Let Pe2 be the probability of the decoding failure. Then, the
legitimate receiver estimates En from Un and Y n.
We can see by similar Gelfand-Pinsker coding argument and Wiretap coding argument that if
0 ≤ R ≤ I(Uα,k;Y )−max{I(Uα,k;SE), I(Uα,k;Z)}, (39)
then, Pe1 and Pe2 goes to zero when n→∞.
Estimation: The legitimate receiver makes an MMSE estimate of V n from the observations of [V ∗n, Unα,k, Y n],
where
V= V ∗ + E, (40)
Uα,k= X + αS + kE,
Y= X + S +W.
Let σ2e = σ2v2−2R. The optimum linear MMSE estimation is given by
Vˆ = λ1V
∗ + λ2Uα,k + λ3Y, (41)
where [λ1, λ2, λ3] are chosen such that minimizes the distortion D = E[‖V − Vˆ ‖2]. We choose the parameters
(α, k) as follows:
α =
P
P +N1
, (42)
k2 = P
P +N1 −N12
2R
σ2v(P +N1)
.
We can see the the above choice for (α, k) satisfies the condition of (39). Let Λ be the covariance matrix of
(V ∗n, Unα,k, Y
n)T and let Γ be the correlation vector between V and (V ∗n, Unα,k, Y n)T . The matrices of Λ and Γ
then are given by
Λ =

 σ2v − σ2e 0 00 P + α2Q+ k2σ2e P + αQ
0 P + αQ P +Q+N1

 (43)
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and
Γ = (σ2v − σ
2
e , kσ
2
e , 0)
T (44)
The coefficients of the linear MMSE estimation are given by (λ1, λ2, λ3)T = Λ−1Γ and the minimum distortion
is given by
D = σ2v − Γ
T
Λ
−1
Γ (45)
=
σ2v
P+N1
N1
Note that this scheme is an intermediate scheme between the secure digital dirty paper coding wit the maximum
possible binning and the hybrid digital-analog scheme I with the minimum possible bining. We can therefore have
a family of schemes with varying bins by changing R such that the condition of (39) is satisfied.
Theorem 4: For the problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side
information knowing at the transmitter, there exists an infinite family of optimum secure joint source channel
coding scheme with a variable number of binning.
Note that the scheme III is closely related to the secure digital dirty paper coding and the scheme II. The
difference however is that in the scheme III, the transmitted signal is not a superposition of the two signals as seen
in the scheme II.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEMES WITH SNR MISMATCH
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed secure joint source channel coding schemes in the
presence of SNR1 mismatch. Here, we assume that we have designed the schemes to be optimum for a designed
channel SNRd, but the actual SNR1 is such that SNR2 < SNRd < SNR1. Separation based digital schemes
suffer from the threshold effect. When the actual channel SNR1 is worse than the designed SNRd, the index cannot
be decoded and therefore the distortion drastically increases. When the actual channel SNR1 is better than the
designed SNRd, the distortion is limited by the quantization and does not improve. Thus, the distortion exponent
of the separation based scheme is ζ = 0. Our proposed secure hybrid digital-analog schemes however offer better
performance in the presence of SNR1 mismatch.
A. Performance Analysis of Scheme I
Let consider the proposed scheme I, which is designed for a SNRd while actual signal-to-noise ratio is SNR1 >
SNRd > SNR2. The receiver can estimate the actual noise power N1. Since the receiver knows that the system
is designed for SNRd, the receiver estimates Vˆ as follows:
Vˆ = λ1dY + λ2dU, (46)
where λ1d and λ2d are given in (25) and (26), respectively when (α, k) are set as follows:
αd=
P
P +Nd
, (47)
k2d=
P 2
σ2v(P +Nd)
.
The received signal is Y = X + S +W , where W ∼ N (0, N1). The actual U is set by the transmitter as follows:
U = X + αdS + kdV, (48)
The actual distortion is therefore given by
Da(SNR1) =
σ2v
(
QN2d +
(
P (P +Q) + 2PNd +N
2
d
)
N1
)
P 2(P +Q) + P (P +Q)Nd +QN
2
d +
(
P (2P +Q) + 3PNd +N
2
d
)
N1
. (49)
A useful measure for robustness of a single coding scheme is the rate of decay of the distortion as a function of the
actual SNR1 when SNR1 → ∞ (see the equation (5)). An upper-bound on the achievable ζ can be obtained by
assuming that a genie informs the transmitter of the actual SNR1 and the transmitter chooses an optimum encoding
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scheme based on the actual SNR1. The distortion for the genie-aided scheme is D = σ
2
v
1+SNR1
. Thus, the distortion
exponent is ζ = 1. Note that in the absence of any side information the distortion exponent of the genie-aided
scheme is ζ = 1. In the the absence of the eavesdropper also, the distortion exponent is ζ = 1. Therefore, for any
single encoding scheme ζ ≤ 1.
From equation (5), the distortion exponent is given by
ζ = − lim
SNR1→∞
logDa(SNR1)
log SNR1
. (50)
1) Absence of Interference: When there is no interference at the transmitter, i.e., Q = 0. We can see from
the equations (49) and (50) that ζ = 1. Therefore, scheme I achieves the optimum distortion Dopt as well as the
optimum distortion exponent ζ = 1.
2) Presence of Interference: In the presence of interference, i.e., Q 6= 0, we can see that ζ = 0. This is because
some residual interference exists in the received signal Y , and therefore in hight SNR1, the distortion exponent
is dominated by this residual interference. However, if optimal distortion is not desired at SNR1, then we can
achieve the optimum distortion exponent of ζ = 1 by using a minor modification in the scheme I. Let modify the
auxiliary random variable U in the scheme I as follows:
U = X + S + k
′
V. (51)
In this modified scheme α is chosen to be 1, which is not an optimum choice for SNRd. According to the valid
region of Fig.2, the value of K ′ must be such that√
P 2 + PQ−QN2
σ2v(P +Q+N2)
< k
′
<
√
P 2 + PQ−QN1
σ2v(P +Q+N1)
. (52)
Hence, k′ can be chosen to be arbitrary close to
√
P 2+PQ−QN1
σ2v(P+Q+N1)
. Now X is transmitted and the received signal
by the legitimate receiver is Y . Using an MMSE estimate for V , the final distortion for a actual SNR1 when the
system is designed for SNRd is given by
Da(SNR1) =
σ2v(P +Q)N1
(P +Q)N1 + k
′2
d σ
2
v(P +Q+N1)
, (53)
where, k′d =
√
P 2+PQ−QNd
σ2v(P+Q+Nd)
. Hence, for SNR1 →∞, the distortion exponent is ζ = 1. Fig. 4. shows the distortion
of different schemes versus SNR1. In this figure P = 1, Q = 2, SNRd = 20dB, N2 = 1, σ2v = 1, and quantization
rate is R = 1.
B. Performance Analysis of Scheme II
Let consider the proposed scheme II, in this section. Again, we assume that the scheme is designed for SNRd,
but the actual is SNR1 > SNd > SNR2. Scheme II consists of two parts, namely secure digital part and secure
hybrid digital-analog part. The performance of the digital part remains constant by increasing the SNR1. Thus,
performance analysis of this scheme is exactly same as scheme I, when we replace σ2v and P with σ2e = σ2v2−2R
and (P +Nd)2−2R −Nd, respectively.
C. Performance Analysis of Scheme III
Next, we analyze the performance of the secure hybrid digital-analog of scheme III under the main channel
mismatch. The different random variables of this scheme are given below.
Ud = X + αdS + kdE, (54)
Y = X + S +W,
V = V ∗ +E,
where αd = PP+Nd , k
2
d = P
P+Nd−Nd22R
σ2v(P+Nd)
. The receiver make an MMSE estimate for V as follows:
Vˆ = (λ1d, λ2d, λ3d)(V
∗, Ud, Y )
T , (55)
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Fig. 4. Distortion Vs SNR1 for different schemes. Here, P = 1, Q = 2, SNRd = 20dB, N2 = 1, σ2v = 1, and R = 1.
where (λ1d, λ2d, λ3d)T = Λd−1Γd, and Λd and Γd are given in (43) and (44), respectively when (α, k) are replaced
with (αd, kd). The actual distortion for the legitimate receiver can therefore written as follows:
Da(SNR1) = σ
2
v − Γ
T
d
Λ
−1
d
Γd (56)
After some math, the actual distortion is given by
Da(SNR1) =
σ2v
(
QN2d +
(
P (P +Q) + 2PNd +N
2
d
)
N1
)
(P +Nd)2(P +Q+N1)− 22R(Nd −N1)P (P +Q+Nd)
. (57)
Note that here the actual distortion depends on the quantization rate R and for a special case of R = 0, the above
equation is equivalent to the equation of (49). Similar to the performance analysis of scheme I, we can see that
when Q = 0, this scheme achieves the optimum distortion exponent of ζ = 1. When Q 6= 0, the distortion exponent
is ζ = 0. However, if the optimum distortion at SNR1 is not required, we can modify the scheme III by choosing
α = 1 to achieve the optimum distortion exponent ζ = 1. As the analysis for this case is straightforward and similar
to analysis of scheme I, we therefore omit it here.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we considered secure joint source channel coding schemes for transmitting an analog source over a
Gaussian wiretap channel with known interference at the transmitter. We showed that the separation based coding
scheme cannot achieve the minimum distortion. We then proposed a few class of schemes which achieved the
optimum distortion. Our proposed schemes are based on Costa’s dirty paper coding scheme and Wyner’s wiretap
channel coding in which the analog source or analog quantization error is not explicitly quantized and embedded
in the transmitted signal. We analyzed the performance of the proposed schemes under SNR mismatch. We showed
that the proposed schemes can obtain a graceful degradation of distortion with SNR under perfect secrecy constant.
The cost of achieving optimum distortion exponent and perfect secrecy, is to design the system near optimum
distortion for a designed SNR. A possible future problem can be if it is still possible to get the optimum distortion
exponent under perfect secrecy constraint when we enforce to get optimum distortion for a design SNR. Another
possible future work is to design the secure joint source-channel coding schemes for the source-channel bandwidth
mismatch (ρ 6= 1).
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